WSJ/China's Army Extends Sway 政局不稳造成中共军方强硬派涉政

A military official adjusts the uniform of a Chinese PLA soldier.

陈凯一语：

中共党奴朝的日渐衰败意味着基于民族主义的“政治军事化”加速到来。 这是一个逻辑的必然。 二战前的日本就是由于“专制政治的僵化”与“经济增长的需求”间不可调和的冲突而进入“军国化”的。 中共党奴朝的“政经冲突”也会带来同样的结局。

Kai Chen's Words:

The instability and precariousness of the Chinese party-state will logically bring about militarization of its political process. Pre-WWII Japan was the same: The conflict between a rigid despotic political system and a fast growing economy necessarily brought about the increasing militarization of Japan's political process. The Chinese party-state will not escape such a destructive pattern.

陈凯博客： www.kaichenblog.blogspot.com

China's Army Extends Sway

政局不稳造成中共军方强硬派涉政

Other Nations Look Warily of Military's Influence on Foreign Policy. But in China, the stability depends on its military. Japan's unusual protest.

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703466104575529810234851000.html

By JEREMY PAGE

BEIJING—Behind China's increasingly fractious relations with its neighbors, which most recently erupted in a territorial row with Japan, is a newly assertive Chinese military whose influence over foreign policy is growing in the run-up to a leadership transition.

Two people hold a sign that says 'We won't allow the Japanese government to bow to pressure from China' during a march in Tokyo Saturday against China's claims to disputed islands.

On Sunday, China and Japan seemed to be edging past their worst dispute in five years, as Japanese leaders called for "mutually beneficial" ties after China thanked Japan's military for evacuating a sick Chinese sailor from a ship in the Pacific on Saturday.

But relations between Asia's two biggest economies remained tense as Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan set off on a hurriedly arranged trip to an Asia-Europe forum in Belgium, where he is expected to seek international support for Japan's position in the territorial dispute.

"It is important to thoroughly explain the stance of our country," Mr. Kan said, speaking a day after Japanese nationalists rallied against China.

In an unusual display of nationalistic fervor, thousands of demonstrators marched through Tokyo's central shopping districts Saturday, harshly criticizing China and the Japanese government's handling of a recent territorial dispute. It is unclear how much the sentiments of the crowd have been embraced by mainstream politicians. No prominent political leaders attended the event.

But the row over Japan's detention of a Chinese fishing vessel near the disputed islands in the East China Sea has reinforced concerns in Tokyo and other capitals that China's decisions are increasingly shaped by the People's Liberation Army, or PLA, analysts say.

The PLA's heavy-handed response to recent U.S. military exercises with South Korea and over U.S. statements on the South China Sea has already provoked a backlash across Asia, as Japan and several Southeast Asian nations look to shore up ties with the U.S.

February 2010: Three senior PLA officers call for China to sell U.S. Treasury bonds to retaliate for U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. China has since said it has no such plans

March: Chinese officials tell their U.S. counterparts that Beijing considers South China Sea a 'core interest'—on a par with Taiwan and Tibet

May: A PLA rear admiral calls the U.S. a 'hegemon' at U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue

June: Two PLA generals clash verbally with Defense Secretary Robert Gates at a conference in Singapore.

July: Several PLA officers protest in Chinese state media after Secretary of State Hillary Clinton says the U.S. has a national interest in freedom of navigation in South China Sea.

August: A PLA major general warns against a U.S. joint military exercise with South Korea, saying: 'If no one harms me, I harm no one, but if someone harms me, I must harm them'.

September: Serving and retired PLA officers call for China to deploy military ships to disputed islands with Japan and to push up the yen's value to hurt Japanese exporters.

September: A PLA major general reprimands Japan's former deputy foreign minister over the handling of the captured fishingboat captain at a conference in Singapore.

.The Chinese military's political clout is expected to grow as the Communist Party's ruling Politburo Standing Committee—whose nine members are all civilians and don't include a foreign-policy specialist— prepares for China's change to new leadership in 2012. That process begins in earnest with a party meeting, starting Oct. 15, when attention will focus on whether Xi Jinping, the presumed heir to party chief and President Hu Jintao, is appointed vice chairman of the powerful Central Military Commission, which oversees the PLA.

It is unclear to what extent the PLA is unilaterally expanding its traditional role—to defend the party and Chinese territory—or being encouraged by party leaders to redefine China's broader national interests. But the military has become far more outspoken in recent months, frequently upstaging the foreign ministry and heightening concerns in the region and beyond about how China plans to use its economic muscle.

In one recent example, at a conference in Singapore on Sept. 24, Hitoshi Tanaka, a former Japanese deputy foreign minister, made a speech defending Japan's handling of the territorial dispute with China—but also announcing that Japan would release the captain of the detained Chinese fishing vessel.

The audience applauded, but in a question-and-answer session that followed, Mr. Tanaka was reprimanded by Maj. Gen. Zhu Chenghu, dean of China's Defense Affairs Institute, according to an account by the conference's organizer, the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. "Don't try to believe that the Chinese are so evil," Gen. Zhu was quoted as saying by Singapore's Straits Times. "I don't think this kind of announcement will be constructive to the establishment of more mutual cooperation."

In rebuking Mr. Tanaka directly, Gen. Zhu upstaged Tang Jiaxuan, a former Chinese foreign minister and state councilor who had just spoken at the conference.

The episode fits a pattern of recent outbursts by serving generals. At a meeting with visiting U.S. officials in May, PLA navy Rear Adm. Guan Youfei accused the U.S. of being a "hegemon" and treating China as an enemy, to the apparent embarrassment of Chinese diplomats present, according to people familiar with the situation.

In June, at another conference in Singapore, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates was confronted by Gen. Zhu, as well as Gen. Ma Xiaotian, the PLA's deputy chief of the general staff, over U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.

Mr. Gates and other top officials have complained in recent months about what they see as a split in China—between a PLA that, they say, thwarts efforts to improve relations with the U.S., and a political leadership that favors more cooperation.

"I wouldn't undersell that there are real issues that separate the United States and China," said a senior U.S. defense official. "But we need to be able to deal with those issues in a productive way."

Gen. Zhu's presence was indicative of the prevailing attitude in Beijing. He was officially reprimanded in 2005 for telling journalists that China would destroy "hundreds" of U.S. cities with nuclear weapons if Washington intervened in a conflict over Taiwan. He now frequently appears at conferences and in state media alongside other serving and retired officers—to the frustration of many Chinese diplomats and international-relations experts.

"The Chinese military is too powerful in decision-making, especially on foreign policy," said Chu Shulong, an expert on international relations at Tsinghua University in Beijing. He said the main problem was that the 11-member Central Military Commission included only one civilian, its chairman, party chief Hu Jintao.

"The party general secretary is so busy, he can't take care of the military, so the military makes its own decisions without the involvement of civilian leaders," said Mr. Chu.

Some experts argue that many military commentators are expressing their personal opinions, often for financial gain, rather than those of the PLA. Still, they are often featured in tightly censored official newspapers and television shows, which strongly influence public opinion in China.

A report last month by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute noted that "the PLA has increasingly tried to influence the public debate about national security issues by publicly disseminating analysis by PLA research institutions as well as allowing officers to write divergent commentaries in prominent newspapers and serve as television commentators."

The same military institutions and individuals are believed by analysts to feed advice directly to the Politburo Standing Committee.

The combined effect is to put party leaders on the defensive as they try to manage China's increasingly complex international relations, without appearing weak on national security ahead of the leadership change.

Their predecessors, led by former President Jiang Zemin, also had no military background, but secured the PLA's loyalty by increasing the defense budget to fund its modernization program.

The current and future generations of China's political leaders face a different dynamic as the military—increasingly dominated by the navy and air force—explores ways to deploy its new powers. Last year, for example, it sent navy ships past the Japanese island of Okinawa and into the Western Pacific for the first time.

"China is going through a lot of change," said Xu Guangyu, a retired PLA general at the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association, a government think tank. "We now want to protect our national interests, including land borders, territorial waters—and economic interests such as shipping lanes."

Some analysts say the PLA's outspokenness reflects a need for structural overhauls to allow greater dialogue between civilian and military leaders and quicker, unified responses during crises.

One suggestion is the creation of a U.S.-style National Security Council to better coordinate among different branches of government. Another is to include a uniformed figure on the Politburo Standing Committee—something Gen. Xu said was "very possible" in 2012.

A counterproposal advocates more civilians on the Military Commission.

With or without such changes, however, most analysts agree that the PLA's influence is destined to grow, as China's national interests expand in tandem with its economic power.

"A China with global economic interests is already a China with global political interests, and increasingly, a China with expanding global security interests," said David Finkelstein, director of China studies at the CNA Center for Naval Analyses, a federally funded think tank in Virginia.

—Yoree Koh in Tokyo contributed to this article.
Write to Jeremy Page at jeremy.1c