Wednesday, December 28, 2011

共产与纳粹的比较 Why Doesn't Communism Have as Bad a Name as Nazism?

共产的邪恶 The Evil of Communism

Mao's Statue in the Nixon Library, California 尼克松图书馆中的毛塑像


陈凯一语: Kai Chen's Words:

普瑞格尔(Dennis Prager)的这篇文章分析了为什么今天在世界上人们仍不认知共产的邪恶,甚至对共产邪念抱有幻梦。 我希望人们能在这篇文章中对邪恶的力量与人们的道德混乱有清晰与足够的认识。

Dennis Prager's article analyzes why today people in the world, especially those of left-leaning in the West, still have illusions about communism and still cannot come to term with the evil of communism. I only hope people read this article and start thinking deeply about this crucial issue of our time.

Why Doesn't Communism Have as Bad a Name as Nazism?

By: Dennis Prager | Tuesday, March 24, 2009

Why is it that when people want to describe particularly evil individuals or regimes, they use the terms "Nazi" or "Fascist" but almost never "Communist?"

Given the amount the human suffering Communists have caused - 70 million killed in China, 20-30 million in the former Soviet Union, and almost one-third of all Cambodians; the decimation of Tibetan and Chinese culture; totalitarian enslavement of North Koreans, Chinese, Vietnamese, and Russians; a generation deprived of human rights in Cuba; and much more -- why is "Communist" so much less a term of revulsion than "Nazi?"

There are Mao Restaurants in major cities in the Western world. Can one imagine Hitler Restaurants? Che Guevara T-shirts are ubiquitous, yet there are no Heinrich Himmler T-shirts.

This question is of vital significance. First, without moral clarity, humanity has little chance of avoiding a dark future. Second, the reasons for this moral imbalance tell us a great deal about ourselves today.

Here, then, are seven reasons.

1.Communists murdered their own people; the Nazis murdered others.

Under Mao about 70 million people died - nearly all in peacetime! - virtually all of them Chinese. Likewise, the approximately 30 million people that Stalin had killed were nearly all Russians, and those who were not Russian, Ukrainians for example, were members of other Soviet nationalities. The Nazis, on the other hand, killed very few fellow Germans. Their victims were Jews, Slavs, and members of other "non-Aryan" and "inferior" groups. "World opinion" - that vapid amoral concept - deems the murder of members of one's group far less noteworthy than the murder of outsiders. That is one reason why blacks killing millions of fellow blacks in the Congo right now elicits no attention from "world opinion." But if an Israeli soldier is charged with having killed a Gaza woman and two children, it makes the front page of world newspapers.

2.Communism is based on lovely sounding theories; Nazism is based on heinous sounding theories.

Intellectuals, among whom are the people who write history, are seduced by words -- so much so that deeds are deemed considerably less significant. Communism's words are far more intellectually and morally appealing than the moronic and vile racism of Nazism. The monstrous evils of communists have not been focused on nearly as much as the monstrous deeds of the Nazis. The former have been regularly dismissed as perversions of a beautiful doctrine (though Christians who committed evil in the name of Christianity are never regarded by these same people as having perverted a beautiful doctrine), whereas Nazi atrocities have been perceived (correctly) as the logical and inevitable results of Nazi ideology. This seduction by words while ignoring deeds has been a major factor in the ongoing appeal of the left to intellectuals. How else explain the appeal of a Che Guevara or Fidel Castro to so many left-wing intellectuals, other than that they care more about beautiful words than about vile deeds?

3.Germans have thoroughly exposed the evils of Nazism, have taken responsibility for them, and attempted to atone for them. Russians have not done anything similar regarding Lenin's or Stalin's horrors.

Indeed, an ex-KGB man runs Russia, Lenin is still widely revered, and, in the words of University of London Russian historian Donald Rayfield, "people still deny by assertion or implication, Stalin's holocaust." Nor has China in any way exposed the greatest mass murderer and enslaver of them all, Mao Zedong. Mao remains revered in China. Until Russia and China acknowledge the evil their states have done under communism, communism's evils will remain less acknowledged by the world than the evils of the German state under Hitler.

4.Communism won, Nazism lost. And the winners write history.

5.Nothing matches the Holocaust.

The rounding up of virtually every Jewish man, woman, child, and baby on the European continent and sending them to die is unprecedented and unparalleled. The communists killed far more people than the Nazis did but never matched the Holocaust in the systemization of murder. The uniqueness of the Holocaust and the enormous attention paid to it since then has helped ensure that Nazism has a worse name than communism.

6.There is, simply put, widespread ignorance of communist atrocities compared to those of the Nazis.

Whereas, both right and left loathe Nazism and teach its evil history, the left dominates the teaching profession, and therefore almost no one teaches communist atrocities. As much as intellectuals on the left may argue that they loathe Stalin or the North Korean regime, few on the left loathe communism. As the French put it, "pas d'enemis a la gauche," which in English means "no enemies on the left." This is certainly true of Chinese, Vietnamese, and Cuban communism. Check your local university's courses and see how many classes are given on communist totalitarianism or mass murder compared to the number of classes about Nazism's immoral record.

7.Finally, in the view of the left, the last "good war" America fought was World War II, the war against German and Japanese fascism.

The left does not regard America's wars against communist regimes as good wars. The war against Vietnamese communism is regarded as immoral and the war against Korean (and Chinese) communism is simply ignored.

Until the left and all the institutions influenced by the left acknowledge how evil communism has been, we will continue to live in a morally confused world. Conversely, the day the left does come to grips with communism's legacy of human destruction, it will be a very positive sign that the world's moral compass has begun to correct itself.


Dennis Prager hosts a nationally syndicated radio talk show based in Los Angeles. He is the author of four books, most recently "Happiness is a Serious Problem" (HarperCollins). His website is To find out more about Dennis Prager, visit the Creators Syndicate Web page at

Monday, December 26, 2011

Kai Chen on Mao's images in America and the World 陈凯论毛像对美国/西方的危害

Kai Chen on Mao's images in America and the World 陈凯论毛像对美国/西方/世界的危害

Mao's statue in the Nixon Library 尼克松图书馆中的毛塑像

Kai Chen and Wei Jingsheng on Mao's Evil Image and the Communist Infiltration (Video Link):


Destruction of Mao’s Image is a Must

Devil Worship in China Leads to Vicious Dynastic Cycles

“Free Beings” vs. “Chinese”

By Kai Chen 陈凯 (Written 3/15/2011, Reprint 7/29/2011)

从秦始皇到毛泽东,“中国人”崇魔、尊鬼、信邪的病态扭曲导致了一个无限恶性循环的“朝代圈”。 这个邪恶虚无的“朝代圈”是由无信仰、无自由、无尊严、无正义感的人们自编、自进、自欺、自逃而建立的。 同时这个邪恶虚无的“朝代圈”又反过来将一代又一代的“中国人”奴役扭曲为“为社、为皇、为群、为族、为大家”的无灵自阉的“宦奴娼”。 “默默的绝望”是所有以虚为荣、以欺为尚、以奴为耀的“中国人”的必然心态。

大多“中国人”都认为人是环境、文化、祖宗、教育、政府的造物,而不是上苍的创造,不是有自由意志的存在。 他们看不到西方/美国的“人”是“上苍之下,上苍所创”的真实主动的存在,而“中国人”则是“皇政之下”的“祖先圣人”所灌养出来的虚无被动的“奴”,是一个“被权利用”的工具与可有可无的数字。 这就是为什么那些做着“人上人”的“中国梦”的人们到头来总会发现他们几千年来的“奴主梦”不过是一个人吃人的噩梦罢了。

许多我过去的朋友同仁也都认为“稳定”、“和谐”、“繁荣”、“富强”是“中国特色”基于族群观念的价值,“不同于”西方/美国的基于个体的普世永恒 的人的价值 – 真实、正义、自由、尊严。 由此他们都认为秦始皇、毛泽东的遗产与形象是一定要褒扬与保护的,是不能没贬辍与销毁的。 “没有秦、毛,中国就会大乱的。” 他们对真实个体价值的恐惧与对未来未知的逃避是他们自身奴役感、无奈感与绝望感的真实来源。 我实想象不出如果今天意大利的人们仍旧将凯撒作为楷模去效仿,或德国的人们仍旧将希特勒作为偶像去崇拜,或俄国的人们仍旧将斯大林作为榜样去追求,世界会是个什么样子。

“崇魔拜权”所导致的一时稳定与强权只能带来噩梦一般的灾难性后果: 纳粹德国、军国日本、共产苏俄都是这种“崇魔文化”所造成的噩梦。 中国的“共奴儒粹”的党朝将毛泽东的魔像顶礼膜拜作为它的强权合法的基点,其必然的噩梦般结局也是可以预见的。 “崇魔”的人们是“无灵毁灵”的人们。 “中国人”今天的不识真假,不辨是非,不论正邪,不讲对错就是这些无灵自阉的“宦奴娼”的真实写照。 在电影“魔戒”(Lord of the Ring) 中,西方/美国的价值文化是要销毁那个象征强权的魔戒,并杜绝它在人们中的邪恶影响与作用。 而“中国人”却一味迷恋、追求去拥有那个象征强权的魔戒,并将曾经拥有那魔戒的魔鬼们如秦始皇与毛泽东作为偶像、伪神去崇拜。 中国专制文化(腐儒毛共)的反价值就此暴露无遗。

毛像林立、毛钞泛滥、毛语横行、毛尸咒人的今日中国是一个噩梦末日即将到来的垂死党朝。 这犹如一个胭脂遍体的染着艾滋病与梅毒的妓女妄图要用与她上床的人们的众多来证实自身的价值,或一个金粉遍体的泥菩萨试图用跪拜人们的众多来证实它的泥身是真金一样。 真假、是非、正邪、好坏是绝不能用人数多少、强权财富、武力威吓、谎言欺骗而确定的。 有毛像处定无人灵。 有共产处定无正义。 有腐儒处定无尊严。 有强权处定无是非。 有专制处定无自由。 有“中国人”处定无进步与真实。


Tuesday, December 20, 2011

中国广东乌坎村的不寻常抗争 China's Wukan Seige

China's Wukan Seige:
 Could Beijing Resort to Force with Escalating Social Unrest?

Wukan villagers with protest banners demanding justice from Beijing for the land cheated out of them  (Source: The Telegraph)


By Stratfor Global Intelligence

China Director Jennifer Richmond discusses the recent protests in Wukan, Guangdong province, and the characteristics that set them apart from previous incidents of social unrest in China. (Watch CNN news video below covering Wukan protests added by EconMatters)

After months of protests in the village of Wukan in Guangdong province, which started on Sept. 21, the situation escalated this weekend when one of the protest leaders died in custody. Authorities have blockaded the village in an attempt to control the situation while a solution is worked out. As China’s economy slows dissatisfaction grows proportionately and we expect even more incidents in the future.

Reports on Dec. 14 indicate the village cadres — many of whom left Wukan in November as the protests continued and are now suspected of violating discipline —are being held by the Lufeng City Commission.

A common tactic in these protests is to seek provincial or central government intervention. The slow reaction to the protests only lead to an escalation, which is now trying to be redressed with both a show of force and some sort of conciliation to villager demands.

The protests in Wukan began months ago when the Fengtian Livestock company and Country Garden collaborated to use disputed land for development. The villagers claimed the land for their agricultural uses.

This is just one of many protests involving land grabs that have been heightened over the past few years as a result of China’s real estate boom and urbanization, which local governments rely on to boost their incomes.

So why is this one any different? There are several things about this protest that have caught our attention.

First, the duration. The villagers have maintained these protests for over several months. Usually these protests die down when local officials are able to buy off a handful of people or strike some sort of negotiation.

Second, the numbers. Although the protesters themselves only amount to a thousand or so citizens, the entire village of approximately 20,000 appears united in its stance against the local government.

And third, the response. The protests lead to the retreat of village officials and the cordoning off of the entire village from any ingoing or outgoing traffic. Although we’ve seen this tactic employed at least once before in Zhejiang province, it is not common and therefore notable.

As we’ve always stated before, many of these protests are local and can be contained locally. Ultimately they pose little threat to the central government. However, we’ve noted several incidents, including the recent protests over a factory in Dalian, where the local government has capitulated to citizen demands.

People look to Beijing to intervene against corrupt local officials, and Beijing is often able to shield itself from criticism by setting itself apart from local governments that are most often the targets of social unrest.

As China’s economy slows — and we are witnessing a rapidly slowing economy as Europe’s economic turmoil affects China’s exports — protests increase and put increasing pressure on Beijing to manage local uprisings with dwindling economic resources.

As similar protests occur throughout the country, and if they demonstrate the same level of solidarity as in Wukan, Beijing will be forced to respond and will do so through a mixture of force and incentives.

If Beijing mishandles these protests — and the margin for error increases as the protests expand and become more united — the focus could turn to the central government. Further, if protest tactics are able to increasingly force a favorable response for the citizens, they become emboldened. In the end, Beijing will not hesitate to resort to force, especially if the mandate of the Chinese Communist Party comes into question.

EconMatters Note: Wukan Village reportedly has become self-governed and completely outside of the central government's control after the villagers kicked out the last government official on 12 Dec. This is totally unprecedented since Mao took over the Mainland in 1949. 

Wukan is a fishing village of approximately 20,000, and has now been cut off food, electricity, and half of the water supplies. British paper the Telegraph so far was the only foreign media managed to send a reporter into the village and described the Party has lost all control in a situation of open revolt. Any news about Wukan is heavily censored by China's Great Firewall.

Wednesday, December 14, 2011

陈凯访谈/中国党朝的体育之病态 The Perversion of China's Sports

【禁闻】中国足球落后与举国体制因果论 China's Sports Perversion


The Perversion of China's Sports

Youtube link:














新唐人记者陈汉 宋风 肖颜 采访报导

Friday, December 9, 2011

只有“人性”的原弊,而绝无“民族性”的逃避 “Human Nature/Sin and Potential” vs. “China’s People Race”

Chinese Kneeling to Others 中国人向人下跪


“Human Nature/Sin and Potential” vs. “China’s People Race”

人的“原弊”与“伟大的可能” vs. “群体的逃避”与“朝代循环”

“Free Beings” vs. “Chinese” Series

By Kai Chen 陈凯 12/9/2011

许多中国人常常将“民族”与“民族性”(People Race--一个极为病态与怪诞的伪概念)挂在嘴边,使人觉得他们是在用一个根本不能定义的伪词汇为某个他们每一个人都想逃脱而又无法逃脱的东西喷雾水。 说到底,“中国人”似乎永远都在渴望着用群体来逃避个体,用“民族性”来逃避“人性”(Human Nature)中的原弊 (Sin)与人性中的,在上苍的道德指引下的,发掘的潜力与人的伟大的可能(Possibilities and Potentials)。

人(Human)不可能成为神(God)。 人不可能摆脱自身的原弊(Sin)与“不完美”(Fallibility)。 因此人也绝不应该去寻找/试图建立什么完美社会,或仰望/期待什么完美的人间“救星”(Human Agencies)去解决人间的问题。 基督精神对人性的真实解义与西方的自由理念基此而产生的社会科学造成了今天我们所见的自由社会(绝不完美但永远向前并挑战未知的“创造性”社会)。 道德的绝对(好与坏、真与假,是与非,对与错,正义与邪恶的区分)是指引这些自由社会的基点与指南。 “分权”,“司法独立”,“新闻、言论、宗教信仰、结社集会等等自由/权利”就逻辑地与自然地成为自由社会的,抑制人性中的“原弊”的必要手段与安排。 人性中的对“真实、正义、自由、尊严”的渴望与追求也就因此得到褒扬与扩展。 一个不断向前、不断创新、不断摈弃人的“鬼性与奴性”的、不断接近人的“伟大的潜力”的、充满活力的但“绝不可能完美的”道德/自由社会就此形成。 爱、希望与进步便由于这种有真实信仰的“自由人”对人性中原弊的承认与对人性的真实面对成为现实(Reality)。

“人性”中有基于人的原弊(Sin)的“鬼性”与“奴性”,也有基于“尊崇上苍”的“神性”与“人的伟大(Greatness)”。 不承认人的“原弊”而产生的“人可以成为神”的病态幻觉导致了中国的人们对“完美的专制”的憧憬与对“人间上帝/救星”的渴望与期待。 每一个杀人无数的中国的王朝就是这种对“完美的专制/人间天堂”的病态向往而产生的。 “跪人”而“不跪神”就是这些拒绝人性的“不完美”与拒绝真实的信仰的中国的人们外在的行为规范。 基督精神中的“只跪神”而“绝不跪人”的道德准则是与中国的人们的病态言行相反的道德/自由社会的基点。

只有承认人的“原弊”才有可能承认人有“进步”与“实现自身伟大”的可能。 (幻觉能成神的人也逻辑地表明他们可以消灭“原弊”的方式去拒绝个体自由与选择。 因此 否认与消灭人的“原弊”也就必然否认与消灭了“人可以自由与不断进步”的可能。 “能成神”的“中国人”就此造成了一个又一个的“僵死不前”的“自命为人间天堂”的专制王朝。 窒息人性的“尿盆、粪坑、酱缸文化”就此成为“中国人”最习惯的常态。 中国的人们在“温暖发酵”的儒家“中庸”的粪坑中成为了“他人粪便中”的蛆虫,成为了“既吃不好/吃不饱也饿不死”的奴才。 说到底“屎虼螂文化”就是否认“人的原弊”与“人的伟大”的“人能成神”(通过“枪杆子/暴力与修身养性/向善”)的畸形心态的鲜明写照。

为了逃避每一个个体的原弊、每一个个体伟大的可能与每一个个体选择的责任与必须承担的后果,“中国人”就不遗余力地寻找/制造逃避真实“人性”的各种理念与语言词汇。 从儒学孔教到马列主义,从秦始皇到毛泽东,从传统专制奴役到社会主义/共产主义的暴政, 从“拥共崇毛”的狂热到迷恋“繁荣富强“的当代民族主义,“中国人”在“尿盆”,“粪坑”与让人绝望的“朝代泥潭”中滚动杀戮了几千年。 蛔虫、蛆虫、屎虼螂就是这“永恒杀戮”所必然衍生的产物与怪胎。 “人性”中的原弊与人的伟大的可能被“中国人”抛到九霄云外。 “民族”与“民族性”(蛔虫性、蛆虫性、屎虼螂性)成了人们的口头禅。 个体的生命、自由与尊严一次又一次地被泯灭。 “人”再一次在伟大的“民族复兴”中成为了专制奴役牺牲品与工具。 人的“鬼性与奴性”再一次得到了认同,扩大与褒扬。 又一个崇尚杀戮的“新王朝”正在即将到来的“共后”时代被中国的人们孕育着。 只要看一看今天的埃及或伊朗的“革命”(伊斯兰王朝的复兴)与世界上举不胜举的“杀人王朝循环”的例子,你就会懂得今天的中国正在走向何处。

“民族性”、“民族情感”、“民族利益”、“民族大业”、“民族精神”、“民族崛起”等等大量的伪词汇是今天中国的人们逃避“真实人性”的遁词,是“善走捷径”的“中国人”逃避个体自由与选择的病态人的畸形心态写照。 请记住: 那些高谈“民族”、“民族性”、“民族情结”的人们说轻了是在卖狗皮膏药,说重了是在贩毒与吃人。 他们与孔儒,秦皇与毛共一样,都是寄生在他人身上的“吸血鬼”(Vampires)与吃人肉的“活死人”(Zombies)罢了。

我的忠告: 离那些常将“民族”与“中华”挂在嘴头上的人远一点。

Kai Chen Interview on "Human Rights"

Click "Listening to Program" to hear the interview.




Tuesday, December 6, 2011

中国经济濒临崩盘 China is Going Down

China's Ghost Cities 中国的“鬼城”

China's central bank in Beijing cut the reserve requirement ratio for its banks on Nov. 30 for the first time in nearly three years to ease credit strains and shore up activity in the world's second-largest economy. /Reuters/Soo Hoo Zheyang


China was going to save the global economy? Guess again

Sol W. Sanders

Creeping up on the outer edges of Wall Street soothsayers’ economic crystal ball, until now dominated by American and Euro crises, is growing concern about China.

The inane idea China [and India, which is also in trouble] would somehow rescue the world economy is now, finally, dismissed by the pundits — without apologies. How a largely export-led, mercantilist economy was to save the world with its principle markets in the U.S. and the EU winnowing down was never explained. Continued wishful references to Chinese leadership’s equally improbable promises to boost domestic consumption are also falling away.

There is, in fact, a growing consensus the Chinese economy is spiraling down. One respected Hong Kong economist, Ms. Wang Tao of UBS, is predicting a gross domestic growth [GDP] rate toward 7 percent before year’s end. That’s below the red line 8 percent long considered by the double-domes as the minimum to satisfy jobs for China’s growing population.

Soon we can hope to hear an end to those straight-line projections — so wrong two decades ago in Japan predictions — which take China’s current world No. 2 GDP to soaring heights. Indeed, China is the classic example of inadequacies of GDP as an economic barometer. Even assuming official figures are reliable — which is a far stretch — China’s GDP has inflated with vast over expansion of infrastructure and massive corruption indicating enormous activity but not necessarily a basis for continued stability and growth. [Remember Euroland’s GDP/consumption figures before the fall!] Nor do we have more than a notional figure for huge military outlays.

Granted, some of us who have been predicting a China crash for years, arguing its miraculous transformation was jerrybuilt. But we have always said what would trip the fall, when, and how the Chinese would cope with it, is unpredictable — as so many things in life. Some full-time observers are now turning to the banking structure as chief concern. Whether you look at inadequacies of Communist Party decision makers in their see-saw battle to maintain maximum growth but head off any hint of inflation, a traditional Chinese destroyer of dynasties, the outlook is grim.

Larry Lang, a Hong Kong TV personality and Chinese University professor of finance, recently labeled provincial finances as “China’s many Greeces”. Beijing’s writ — as an old proverb goes — ends no longer at the village gate but increasingly at the provincial capital where regional authorities defy the center, desperate to meet growing resources demands.

Local politicos have wheedled, persuaded, bribed and threatened local government banks into credit far beyond their capacity to repay. Add that to the huge stock of non-performing loans banks give their Party buddies in the huge inefficient government companies and you have what could be the mother of all financial fiascos.

Just as politics does not end at the banks’ doors, the Communist Party is moving into a generational leadership succession year. In theory, the new president and prime minister have been anointed. But there is a lot of shin-kicking with the usual Communist turn to so-called ideological arguments masking personality, regional and purely economic interests.

A kind of neo-Maoism has surfaced. And it could take on new life as economic problems deepen because there has always been a strong Party constituency for preserving Soviet controls, planning and government ownership. Never mind that the fabled Chinese entrepreneurial spirit has taken hold with the partial liberalization of the past two decades. But much of this private sector with its disproportionately higher productivity was exports now hit hard with the downturn in the U.S. and Europe.

This has collapsed thousands of private businesses, particularly in South China’s clothing and gizmo assembly operations, leading to dramatic literal disappearances of owners and managers and growing unemployment. This, in turn, has fed already escalating unrest; Beijing has stopped reporting even the very suspect official figures.

It’s early on, of course, to predict this would develop into the kind of provincial disintegration bringing down virtually every China ruling dynasty through its long history. Still….

Meanwhile, China’s drop in demand for raw materials is already hitting world commodity markets — iron ore, for example, and soon to be coal and soya. That will have its effects on the overseas suppliers from Angola to Brazil to Australia [which has already seen a 10 percent drop in its high-flying dollar of a few weeks ago.]


Sol W. Sanders, (, writes the ‘Follow the Money’ column for The Washington Times on the convergence of international politics, business and economics. He is also a contributing editor for and

Friday, December 2, 2011

中共党朝的老子与太子 WSJ/Children of the Revolution

Children of the Revolution 中共的太子党

“红歌王”薄熙来与太子薄瓜瓜 Bo Xilai, with his son, at a memorial ceremony held for his father in Beijing, in 2007.


陈凯一语: Kai Chen's Words: 
“太子党”现象只说明了一个真实:中共就是中国。 如果说现在还有人否认中共与中国专制文化/王朝的必然联系,那他不是一个白痴就是一个骗子。

"The Princelings" phenomenon only demonstrates an undeniable truth: China's Communist Party-Dynasty has deep roots in Chinese despotic mindset/tradition. Chinese Party-Dynasty is no question founded on the traditional Chinese despotism. Chinese communist party is China indeed. If now someone still has doubts on this point, then he/she is either a moron or a man-eating monster.
Children of the Revolution

China's 'princelings,' the offspring of the communist party elite, are embracing the trappings of wealth and privilege—raising uncomfortable questions for their elders..

By JEREMY PAGE -- Wall Street Journal

One evening early this year, a red Ferrari pulled up at the U.S. ambassador's residence in Beijing, and the son of one of China's top leaders stepped out, dressed in a tuxedo.

(Grandfather, Bo Yibo — Helped lead Mao's forces to victory, only to be purged in the 1966-76 Cultural Revolution. Subsequently rehabilitated.

Son, Bo Guagua — Graduate student at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government.

Father, Bo Xilai — Party secretary of Chongqing and Politburo member, likely to rise to the Politburo standing committee in 2012.)

Bo Guagua, 23, was expected. He had a dinner appointment with a daughter of the then-ambassador, Jon Huntsman.

The car, though, was a surprise. The driver's father, Bo Xilai, was in the midst of a controversial campaign to revive the spirit of Mao Zedong through mass renditions of old revolutionary anthems, known as "red singing." He had ordered students and officials to work stints on farms to reconnect with the countryside. His son, meanwhile, was driving a car worth hundreds of thousands of dollars and as red as the Chinese flag, in a country where the average household income last year was about $3,300.

The episode, related by several people familiar with it, is symptomatic of a challenge facing the Chinese Communist Party as it tries to maintain its legitimacy in an increasingly diverse, well-informed and demanding society. The offspring of party leaders, often called "princelings," are becoming more conspicuous, through both their expanding business interests and their evident appetite for luxury, at a time when public anger is rising over reports of official corruption and abuse of power.

A Family Affair

A look at China's leaders, past and present, and their offspring, often known as 'princelings.'

State-controlled media portray China's leaders as living by the austere Communist values they publicly espouse. But as scions of the political aristocracy carve out lucrative roles in business and embrace the trappings of wealth, their increasingly high profile is raising uncomfortable questions for a party that justifies its monopoly on power by pointing to its origins as a movement of workers and peasants.

Their visibility has particular resonance as the country approaches a once-a-decade leadership change next year, when several older princelings are expected to take the Communist Party's top positions. That prospect has led some in Chinese business and political circles to wonder whether the party will be dominated for the next decade by a group of elite families who already control large chunks of the world's second-biggest economy and wield considerable influence in the military.

"There's no ambiguity—the trend has become so clear," said Cheng Li, an expert on Chinese elite politics at the Brookings Institution in Washington. "Princelings were never popular, but now they've become so politically powerful, there's some serious concern about the legitimacy of the 'Red Nobility.' The Chinese public is particularly resentful about the princelings' control of both political power and economic wealth."

The current leadership includes some princelings, but they are counterbalanced by a rival nonhereditary group that includes President Hu Jintao, also the party chief, and Premier Wen Jiabao. Mr. Hu's successor, however, is expected to be Xi Jinping, the current vice president, who is the son of a revolutionary hero and would be the first princeling to take the country's top jobs. Many experts on Chinese politics believe that he has forged an informal alliance with several other princelings who are candidates for promotion.
Among them is the senior Mr. Bo, who is also the son of a revolutionary leader. He often speaks of his close ties to the Xi family, according to two people who regularly meet him. Mr. Xi's daughter is currently an undergraduate at Harvard, where Mr. Bo's son is a graduate student at the Kennedy School of Government.

“Princelings were never popular, but now ... there's some serious concern about the legitimacy of the 'Red Nobility.' ”

Already in the 25-member Politburo, Bo Xilai is a front-runner for promotion to its top decision-making body, the Standing Committee. He didn't respond to a request for comment through his office, and his son didn't respond to requests via email and friends.

The antics of some officials' children have become a hot topic on the Internet in China, especially among users of Twitter-like micro-blogs, which are harder for Web censors to monitor and block because they move so fast. In September, Internet users revealed that the 15-year-old son of a general was one of two young men who crashed a BMW into another car in Beijing and then beat up its occupants, warning onlookers not to call police.

An uproar ensued, and the general's son has now been sent to a police correctional facility for a year, state media report.

Top Chinese leaders aren't supposed to have either inherited wealth or business careers to supplement their modest salaries, thought to be around 140,000 yuan ($22,000) a year for a minister. Their relatives are allowed to conduct business as long as they don't profit from their political connections. In practice, the origins of the families' riches are often impossible to trace.

Last year, Chinese learned via the Internet that the son of a former vice president of the country—and the grandson of a former Red Army commander—had purchased a $32.4 million harbor-front mansion in Australia. He applied for a permit to tear down the century-old mansion and to build a new villa, featuring two swimming pools connected by a waterfall.

Many princelings engage in legitimate business, but there is a widespread perception in China that they have an unfair advantage in an economic system that, despite the country's embrace of capitalism, is still dominated by the state and allows no meaningful public scrutiny of decision making.
The state owns all urban land and strategic industries, as well as banks, which dole out loans overwhelmingly to state-run companies. The big spoils thus go to political insiders who can leverage personal connections and family prestige to secure resources, and then mobilize the same networks to protect them.

The People's Daily, the party mouthpiece, acknowledged the issue last year, with a poll showing that 91% of respondents believed all rich families in China had political backgrounds. A former Chinese auditor general, Li Jinhua, wrote in an online forum that the wealth of officials' family members "is what the public is most dissatisfied about."

One princeling disputes the notion that she and her peers benefit from their "red" backgrounds. "Being from a famous government family doesn't get me cheaper rent or special bank financing or any government contracts," Ye Mingzi, a 32-year-old fashion designer and granddaughter of a Red Army founder, said in an email. "In reality," she said, "the children of major government families get very high scrutiny. Most are very careful to avoid even the appearance of improper favoritism."

For the first few decades after Mao's 1949 revolution, the children of Communist chieftains were largely out of sight, growing up in walled compounds and attending elite schools such as the Beijing No. 4 Boys' High School, where the elder Mr. Bo and several other current leaders studied.

In the 1980s and '90s, many princelings went abroad for postgraduate studies, then often joined Chinese state companies, government bodies or foreign investment banks. But they mostly maintained a very low profile.

Now, families of China's leaders send their offspring overseas ever younger, often to top private schools in the U.S., Britain and Switzerland, to make sure they can later enter the best Western universities. Princelings in their 20s, 30s and 40s increasingly take prominent positions in commerce, especially in private equity, which allows them to maximize their profits and also brings them into regular contact with the Chinese and international business elite.

Younger princelings are often seen among the models, actors and sports stars who gather at a strip of nightclubs by the Workers' Stadium in Beijing to show off Ferraris, Lamborghinis and Maseratis. Others have been spotted talking business over cigars and vintage Chinese liquor in exclusive venues such as the Maotai Club, in a historic house near the Forbidden City.
On a recent afternoon at a new polo club on Beijing's outskirts, opened by a grandson of a former vice premier, Argentine players on imported ponies put on an exhibition match for prospective members. 
"We're bringing polo to the public. Well, not exactly the public," said one staff member. "That man over there is the son of an army general. That one's grandfather was mayor of Beijing."
Princelings also are becoming increasingly visible abroad. Ms. Ye, the fashion designer, was featured in a recent edition of Vogue magazine alongside Wan Baobao, a jewelry designer who is the granddaughter of a former vice premier.

But it is Bo Guagua who stands out among the younger princelings. No other child of a serving Politburo member has ever had such a high profile, both at home and abroad.

His family's status dates back to Bo Yibo, who helped lead Mao's forces to victory, only to be purged in the 1966-76 Cultural Revolution. Bo Yibo was eventually rehabilitated, and his son, Bo Xilai, was a rising star in the party by 1987, when Bo Guagua was born.

The boy grew up in a rarefied environment—closeted in guarded compounds, ferried around in chauffeur-driven cars, schooled partly by tutors and partly at the prestigious Jingshan school in Beijing, according to friends.

In 2000, his father, by then mayor of the northeastern city of Dalian, sent his 12-year-old son to a British prep school called Papplewick, which according to its website currently charges £22,425 (about $35,000) a year.

About a year later, the boy became the first person from mainland China to attend Harrow, one of Britain's most exclusive private schools, which according to its website currently charges £30,930 annually.

In 2006, by which time his father was China's commerce minister, Mr. Bo went to Oxford University to study philosophy, politics and economics. The current cost of that is about £26,000 a year. His current studies at Harvard's Kennedy School cost about $70,000 a year.

“'The children of major government families get very high scrutiny,' says the granddaughter of a Red Army founder.”

A question raised by this prestigious overseas education, worth a total of almost $600,000 at today's prices, is how it was paid for. Friends said that they didn't know, though one suggested that Mr. Bo's mother paid with the earnings of her legal career. Her law firm declined to comment.

Bo Guagua has been quoted in the Chinese media as saying that he won full scholarships from age 16 onward. Harrow, Oxford and the Kennedy School said that they couldn't comment on an individual student.
The cost of education is a particularly hot topic among members of China's middle class, many of whom are unhappy with the quality of schooling in China. But only the relatively rich can send their children abroad to study.

For others, it is Bo Guagua's freewheeling lifestyle that is controversial. Photos of him at Oxford social events—in one case bare-chested, other times in a tuxedo or fancy dress—have been widely circulated online.

In 2008, Mr. Bo helped to organize something called the Silk Road Ball, which included a performance by martial-arts monks from China's Shaolin temple, according to friends. He also invited Jackie Chan, the Chinese kung fu movie star, to lecture at Oxford, singing with him on stage at one point.

The following year, Mr. Bo was honored in London by a group called the British Chinese Youth Federation as one of "Ten Outstanding Young Chinese Persons." He was also an adviser to Oxford Emerging Markets, a firm set up by Oxford undergraduates to explore "investment and career prospects in emerging markets," according to its website.
This year, photos circulated online of Mr. Bo on a holiday in Tibet with another princeling, Chen Xiaodan, a young woman whose father heads the China Development Bank and whose grandfather was a renowned revolutionary. The result was a flurry of gossip, as well as criticism on the Internet of the two for evidently traveling with a police escort. Ms. Chen didn't respond to requests for comment via email and Facebook.

A Home Fit for a Princeling : A $32.4 million harborside mansion in Sydney.

Asked about his son's apparent romance at a news conference during this year's parliament meeting, Bo Xilai replied, enigmatically, "I think the business of the third generation—aren't we talking about democracy now?"

Friends say that the younger Mr. Bo recently considered, but finally decided against, leaving Harvard to work on an Internet start-up called The domain is registered to an address in Beijing. Staff members there declined to reveal anything about the business. "It's a secret," said a young man who answered the door.

It is unclear what Mr. Bo will do after graduating and whether he will be able to maintain such a high profile if his father is promoted, according to friends. He said during a speech at Peking University in 2009 that he wanted to "serve the people" in culture and education, according to a Chinese newspaper, Southern Weekend.

He ruled out a political career but showed some of his father's charisma and contradictions in answering students' questions, according to the newspaper. Asked about the pictures of him partying at Oxford, he quoted Chairman Mao as saying "you should have a serious side and a lively side," and went on to discuss what it meant to be one of China's new nobility.
"Things like driving a sports car, I know British aristocrats are not that arrogant," he said. "Real aristocrats absolutely don't do that, but are relatively low-key."

—Dinny McMahon contributed to this article.